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Abstract 
 
Despite a growing literature on the consequences of group-based guilt and shame, little work 
has examined how expressions of self-conscious emotions are received by targets of 
collective wrongdoing.  Two experiments tested the hypothesis that when an outgroup 
member offers apologies accompanied by reparations, the recipients are likely to take insult 
unless the outgroup member expresses the self-abasing emotion of shame rather than guilt.  
Experiment 1 showed that when reparations were offered, participants were less insulted by 
shame than guilt expressed by an outgroup member, rather than an ingroup member.  
Experiment 2 improved Experiment 1 by manipulating the culprit’s action (reparation vs. 
withdrawal), and this experiment replicated Experiment 1’s interaction on a measure of 
insult, but only when reparations were offered.  These interactions on insult were not 
explained by the emotion’s perceived intensity or surprisingness.   Our results indicate a 
possible functional aspect of expressions of shame in an intergroup context.  Self-abasement, 
as opposed to a mere admission of culpability and regret, can reduce the insult taken from an 
outgroup's reparations.
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Shame Expressions Reduce the Recipient’s Insult from Outgroup Reparations 
 
Expressions of remorse for official and collective misdeeds have increased in recent 
years, leading commentators to describe the present day as an "age of apology" (Brooks, 
2003).  Recent examples include the State of Virginia’s official apology for the past 
enslavement of African-Americans, South African ex-minister Adriaan Vlok’s public 
washing of Reverend Frank Chikane’s feet in contrition for crimes of the apartheid era, and 
the apologies offered by News Corporation for its plans to publish the ill-regarded O. J. 
Simpson book If I Did It.  Often these apologies are accompanied by emotional expressions 
of sorrow, regret, guilt or shame, as well as by offers of restitution.  This research 
investigates the hypothesis that shame can be a more effective expression than guilt in 
reducing insult taken by wronged groups when such an offer of restitution is made. 
The emotions that accompany apologies have been the subject of much social 
psychological research. Some studies have examined how guilt and compensation emerge as 
individual responses to evidence of being prejudiced (Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Ashburn-
Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002).  Collective guilt can also be felt in response to injustices 
carried out by one’s own group in the past, and can generate support for group-level 
compensation (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 
1998).   Additionally, dominant-group guilt (e.g., White guilt) can arise when one’s own 
group privilege is seen as illegitimate (Branscombe, 2002).  From this research, it seems that 
eliciting guilt in the perpetrator may have positive effects on his or her actions, such as 
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increasing willingness to provide reparations (but see also Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006 for 
infrahumanization as a defense against guilt).  
Such consequences are consistent with an extensive literature at the interpersonal 
level, in which guilt has been investigated in tandem with shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
Research has built on the work of Lewis (1971) to propose a distinction between the two 
emotions. In this tradition, guilt involves an appraisal of  the action’s wrongness, and leads to 
the approach actions of reparation and apology.  Shame, in contrast, involves an appraisal 
that one’s core self is bad, and leads to avoidant or angry behavior.  Research on individuals 
has generally shown that proneness to guilt is associated with empathy, whereas proneness to 
shame involves more painful emotions and accompanies social and personal problems 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002).     
Studies of vicarious guilt and shame for other group members’ acts, too, show that 
shame hinges on the group’s core essence while guilt hinges on personal responsibility 
(Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004), although shame may also be a better motivator 
toward collective action than guilt (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007).  However, research on 
how interpersonal apologies are received has not generally observed distinctions among 
specific self-conscious emotions such as shame and guilt.  In one exception, Proeve & 
Howells (2006) manipulated expressions of “remorse” (in this context, guilt and apology) 
versus shame attributed to an offender, but found no difference in effects of the two 
emotions.  From the existing literature, then, it is not clear what role shame versus guilt 
expressions might play in the reception of an intergroup apology. 
As mentioned, shame is acknowledged to lead to withdrawal action tendencies, often 
a less beneficial outcome for the wronged party than guilt’s approach and reparative 
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tendencies.  However, emotions have multiple functions.  Not only do they orient the 
individual toward action, but they also serve a function of social communication (e.g., 
Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Parkinson, 1996).  With this in mind, guilt has been interpreted as 
signaling desire to reestablish an existing relationship (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 
1994), whereas shame has been seen as serving a more general appeasement function 
(Keltner, Young, and Buswell, 1997). Likewise, in some evolutionary views, guilt functions 
to regulate reciprocal relationships, whereas shame regulates position in the social hierarchy 
(Gilbert, 2003), a view consistent with psychological views of shame that emphasize social 
judgment and exposure as elicitors (Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002).   Even though 
constant proneness to shame may not be functional for an individual, the expression of shame 
in communication between individuals and groups does have a plausible function.  In 
particular, when the behavioral outcomes of emotions are held constant, the communicative 
content of emotions should take center stage in explaining reactions to emotional expressions. 
In the context of an offer of reparations, we believe that an expression of shame will 
be especially likely to overcome the wronged party’s misgivings about accepting handouts 
from an outgroup, and to mitigate the insult taken from compensation.  It is important, 
however, to distinguish our prediction from other theoretical perspectives that might offer 
more general explanations why an outgroup member's shame might be better received than 
guilt.  For example, simple derogation of the outgroup could lead to shame's absolute self-
criticism being preferred over the more limited self-criticism in guilt.  Likewise, as people 
generally prefer dispositional explanations for outgroup negative acts, and situational 
explanations for ingroup negative acts (Pettigrew, 1979), a preference for the "dispositional" 
shame emotion over the "situational" guilt emotion could be expected.   
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Our predictions, however, focus on the insult taken, rather than overall satisfaction or 
attitude, from offers of reparations.  Because an offer of assistance from an outgroup implies 
that the group wants to approach and is in a position to be generous, it can evoke a negative 
reaction among people who mistrust the group’s motives, especially when its status is seen as 
illegitimate or unstable (see Nadler & Halabi, 2006) – conditions especially likely to apply 
after a misdeed by the outgroup.  Thus, an outgroup perpetrator who shows no remorse, or 
who expresses guilty feelings that preserve core self-worth and are more appropriate to a 
reciprocal relationship, risks arousing insult by offering compensation.  However, when the 
emotion of shame is added to an offer of reparations, this negative reaction should be 
mitigated, because the reparations are accompanied by an assurance that they are given in a 
spirit of appeasement and self-abasement.  While the alternative theories predict a general 
preference for shame in outgroup expressions that would extend to other measures such as 
satisfaction, our hypothesis states that, specifically when reparations are offered, an outgroup 
member’s shame apology will lead to specifically less insult than a guilt apology or no 
apology, rather than greater satisfaction.    
 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was an initial test of this hypothesis, manipulating expressions of 
emotion (guilt versus shame), orthogonally with the group (ingroup versus outgroup) of the 
company responsible, within a scenario of apology and reparation for an ecological disaster.  
We predicted an Emotion x Group interaction on insult, such that a guilt apology would be 
more insulting than a shame apology only when coming from an outgroup, but no such 
interaction on satisfaction.   
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We also included measures of surprise and suspicion to guard against the possibility 
that incredulity at an unfamiliar combination of group, emotion, and action could explain any 
interaction among these factors. Finally, we measured how emotionally affected the 
perpetrator seemed, to see whether any interaction of group and emotion on insult could be 
explained by a tendency to see shame as stronger or more sincere than guilt. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-eight participants, 48 female and 30 male, were recruited among the 
undergraduate, graduate and non-degree student population of New School for Social 
Research, in New York. They were approached through instructors of small classes or 
individually, and asked whether they would participate in an experiment in exchange for a 
chocolate bar. 
Materials 
A fictitious small chemical company operating near New York was first described, 
either as American or Russian.  All participants were asked a manipulation check question 
about the company's nationality ("To what extent do you think this company can be called 
American?") and two questions about positive and negative feelings toward the company. 
The questionnaire then briefly described a fictitious ecological incident in which the 
company was responsible for a chemical spill into the Hudson River and the response of the 
company's director.  The emotional response was described first, and varied between 
participants: 
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1. “…feels very sorry about what happened and regrets that he had not taken more 
security measures to prevent it. He feels guilty about the unfortunate accident.” (guilt 
emotion, focused on negative aspects of action) 
2. “…feels that he is a complete failure and that he is a person unable to run a company 
or do anything worthwhile. He feels ashamed about the unfortunate accident."(shame 
emotion, focused on negative aspects of self) 
Participants then indicated on an 11 point scale, “to what degree the director was emotionally 
affected by the event,” and, on a six-point scale, “how much you think the director of the 
company should be blamed for the incident.” 
Reparative behavior was then described: "He decides that what is best is to apologize 
publicly and do everything he can to clean the river and help people affected by the incident." 
Then, participants answered a series of 11 point scaled items that described their reactions: “I 
would feel satisfied”; “I would think it's fair”; “I would feel happy”; “I would be surprised”; 
“I would feel easy”; “I would be hopeful”; “I would feel suspicious”; “I’d feel that the 
director of the company respected me;” I’d feel that the director of the company insulted me; 
“I’d feel that the director of the company valued me”; and “I’d feel offended by the director 
of the company.” Scales ranged from “not at all” to “absolutely.” 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 A Group x Emotion ANOVA on the company’s identity confirmed participants’ 
understanding that the U. S. company was American and the Russian company was not, F(1, 
74) = 17.82, MSE = 6.43, p < .001; no other effects were significant.  Interestingly, 
participants did not show significantly more negative feelings about the Russian company (M 
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= 2.74, SD = 2.33) than the US company (M = 2.59, SD = 2.00) , t(75) = 0.23, ns; and 
actually showed a nonsignificant trend toward more positive feelings about the Russian 
company  (M = 8.61, SD = 2.35) than the US company (M = 7.72, SD = 2.75), t(75) = 1.52, p 
= .13. 
A Group x Emotion ANOVA on the extent to which the director was emotionally 
affected revealed only a significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 62) = 49.03; shame (M = 
8.87) was seen as more affecting than guilt (M = 4.45).  No other effect was significant, F < 
1.  Although 12 participants failed to complete this item, they were equally distributed, six 
each, in the shame and guilt conditions.  The responsibility rating was not significantly 
affected by the manipulations; in particular, shame and guilt responses yielded near equal 
judgments of responsibility, F (1,72) = 0.22, and this was not moderated by group, F(1, 72) = 
0.50. 
Insult, Satisfaction, and Respect Analyses 
 The “insulted” and “offended” items (α = .58) and the “valued” and “respected” items 
(α = .76) were averaged into “insult” and “respect” indices, which were not correlated with 
each other (r = .10). The “satisfied”, “fair”, “happy”, “easy” and “hopeful” items were 
averaged into a satisfaction index (α = .83); respect (r = .43, p < .05) but not insult (r = -.16) 
was correlated with satisfaction. 
 An 2 x 2 ANOVA on insult (MSE = 2.26) showed a reliable Emotion x Group 
interaction, F(1, 74) = 6.98 , p = .01, with no main effects, both p > .40.  In simple effects 
tests, the outgroup’s expression of guilt was more insulting than its expression of shame, F 
(1, 74) = 6.53, p < .05; while the ingroup’s guilt tended to be less insulting than its shame, but 
not significantly so.  Means are shown in Figure 1.  When the “emotionally affected” item 
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was included as a covariate, the interaction remained significant, F(1,61) = 5.78, MSE = 2.24, 
p < .05.   
 A 2 x 2 ANOVA on satisfaction (MSE = 4.37) found a significant main effect of 
emotion, F(1, 74) = 5.06, p < .05; shame led to more satisfaction, M = 7.26, SD = 2.03, than 
did guilt, M = 6.23, SD = 2.18.  The interaction effect was only marginally significant, F(1, 
74) = 2.95, p = .09.   The same analysis on respect showed only a main effect of emotion, 
F(1, 74) = 4.70, MSE = 6.51, p < .05.  Shame was seen as conveying more respect overall, M 
= 5.05, than guilt, M = 3.77.   
 To test the more specific prediction that an outgroup’s shame would mitigate insult 
compared to the outgroup’s guilt or the ingroup’s shame, a planned contrast testing the 
outgroup/shame combination of conditions against outgroup/guilt and ingroup/shame was 
carried out.  The contrast variable, entered after the other two variables in an orthogonal 
coding scheme, was significant (beta = -.25, p < .05) and explained most of the 
manipulations’ effects upon insult (contrast sr2 = 6.3% out of a total R2 of 9%). 
All patterns of significance remained when suspicion and surprise were added as 
covariates. 
Discussion 
As expected, the critical expected interaction between target group and emotion 
emerged principally for insult. Participants considering an outgroup member’s apology in the 
context of reparation took less insult from an expression of shame, as compared to guilt.  
Group membership did not influence judgments of the respect shown by the apology, which 
depended wholly on the emotion shown; shame conveyed greater respect than guilt, 
regardless of which group felt it.   
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It is noteworthy that the group interaction effects on insult were found in the absence 
of overt intergroup bias; the Russian company evoked, if anything, slightly more positive 
feelings than the US company, and no main effects of group on our other variables emerged.  
This pattern of results might be understandable as an outcome of norms among these 
university students against expressing an overt intergroup bias.  However, it would be 
desirable to replicate these results in a context where more overt intergroup bias was shown.  
Finally, the results found on insult were also found in the face of somewhat low reliability of 
the insult items.  Although this speaks to the strength of the result, it also shows that the 
insult measure could be improved. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 further tested our predictions by explicitly contrasting a situation of 
reparations against a no-reparations condition.  Because our predictions about insult and 
shame are specific to situations where an outgroup offers reparations, such a design would 
crucially test our predictions against other predictions based on general group bias, which 
would apply regardless of whether or not reparations were offered.  Adding a third factor that 
varied outgroup action (reparations vs. withdrawal), we expected a higher-order moderating 
effect of this factor in Experiment 2, such that the Group x Emotion interaction found in 
Experiment 1 would only apply in the reparations condition. 
  Given that our theoretical account focuses on the ability of shame to mitigate insult 
from reparations, we also added a condition to the emotion manipulation in which the 
perpetrator was explicitly described as having no emotional reaction, to see whether shame or 
guilt was primarily responsible for Study 1’s effects.   We expected shame expressions to 
evoke lower insult than either guilt or no emotions in the outgroup reparation condition.  We 
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also added more questions measuring insult, to increase the reliability of this key measure. 
Finally, Experiment 2 was conducted with a Galician Spanish population, taking France as an 
outgroup, in the hope that their social norms against expressing bias would not be as strong.  
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred seventy-one participants were recruited for the experiment in the city of 
La Coruña in Galicia, a part of Spain with a strong regional identity, in exchange for a 
payment of 3 Euro (approximately $4 at the time).  The questionnaire was given in high 
school and university classes and at a local community center.  Ages ranged from 15 to 47, 
the mean being 18.85.  Sixteen participants indicated that they were either not from Spain or 
not originally Galician, and were excluded from analyses, because the experiment framed 
Galicia as the ingroup.  This left 255 participants, of whom 120 were male and 135 female.   
Materials  
We added four main modifications to Experiment 1’s design.  First, we included an 
Action factor by adding conditions describing withdrawal rather than reparations, using the 
sentence “He decides that what is best is to abandon the factory, retire, and never start a 
business venture again." Second, a no emotion condition was added in the Emotion factor; 
these scenarios replaced the emotion description with “… does not feel troubled by the 
accident”.  This resulted in a 2 (Action: Withdrawal vs. Reparations) x 3 (Emotion: Shame 
vs. Guilt vs. No Emotion) design.  Third, three new questions measuring insult were added: 
“I would feel angry at the company director,” “I would want revenge against the company 
director,” and “I would feel rejection toward the company director.” Fourth, the company 
was described either as Galician from La Coruña (ingroup) or French from Marseille 
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(outgroup), and the local river Mino was mentioned.  The questionnaire was translated into 
Spanish, back-translated into English, and corrected.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Averaging the three relevant scales, participants understood that the Galician 
company was Galician (M = 9.30, SD = 1.57) and the French company was not (M = 3.82, 
SD = 2.06); t(252) = 23.88, p < .001.  Participants also showed ingroup bias: positive feelings 
were higher for the Galician company (M = 9.05, SD = 2.14) than for the French one (M = 
7.38, SD = 2.60), t(190) = 5.62, p < .001.  Negative feelings were lower for the Galician 
company (M = 2.05, SD = 1.73) than for the French one (M = 2.51, SD = 1.98), t(190) = 
-1.96, p = .05. 
An 2 (group) x 3 (emotion) ANOVA on how much the director was seen as 
emotionally affected revealed a main effect of group, F(2,248) = 11.71, p < .01, MSE = 8.99, 
and a main effect of emotion, F(2, 248) = 17.66, p < .001, but  no significant interaction, F(2, 
248) = 0.05.  The ingroup director (M = 6.99, SD = 3.15) was seen as more affected overall 
than the outgroup director (M = 5.70, SD = 3.20). Guilt (M = 6.06, SD = 3.18) was seen as 
less affecting than shame (M = 7.64, SD = 2.68), but both emotions were more affecting than 
no emotion (M = 4.65, SD = 3.24).  All emotion conditions differed significantly from each 
other by Tukey post-hoc test. 
Judgments of the director’s responsibility were only affected by emotion; F(2,243) = 
5.71, MSE = 1.13, p < .01.  In Tukey post-hoc tests, the guilt condition had a higher mean 
responsibility (M = 4.82, SD = 1.05) than did shame (M = 4.38, SD = 1.07) or no emotion (M 
= 4.33, SD = 1.08) which did not differ from each other. 
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Insult, Satisfaction, and Respect Analyses 
The insult scale showed high reliability at α = .83, and the satisfaction scale at α = 
.90; the two respect items were correlated at r = .84.   Insult and satisfaction showed a weak 
but significant inverse relationship, r = -.21, p = .001; unlike Study 1, insult and respect were 
negatively correlated at r = -.32, p < .001. 
In the Group x Emotion x Action ANOVA on insult (MSE = 4.93), there was a main 
effect of action, F(1, 242) = 9.57, p < .001, such that withdrawal was more insulting than 
reparation.  More importantly, there was a significant three-way interaction, F(2, 242) = 3.69, 
p < .05.  Figure 2 shows means for this interaction.  Simple effects tests showed that within 
the reparation condition, the Group x Emotion interaction of Experiment 1 was replicated, 
F(2,242) = 3.35, p < .05.  Building on Experiment 1, and showing the importance of 
reparations to our effects on insult, the Group x Emotion interaction was not found in the 
withdrawal condition, F(2, 242) = 0.64.  Simple effects of emotion within each combination 
of group and action condition showed that only for the outgroup member offering reparation 
did emotion have an effect, F(2, 242) = 6.42, p < .01; all other F < 1.04.  Tukey post-hoc 
comparisons showed that for the outgroup member offering reparation, shame was less 
insulting than guilt or no emotion, which did not differ from each other.  This difference from 
an emotionless expression establishes the key role of a shame expression in mitigating insult.   
Extending the contrast analyses from Experiment 1, planned contrasts comparing 
outgroup shame against outgroup guilt, outgroup no emotion, and ingroup shame were 
carried out separately for reparation and withdrawal conditions. In reparation, this contrast 
representing a reduction in insult from outgroup shame was significant, beta = -.30, p < .001, 
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and explained the majority of model variance, R2 = .11, contrast sr2 = .09. In withdrawal, the 
contrast was not significant, beta = .07, p = .77. 
Entering surprise and suspicion as covariates, the three-way interaction on insult 
remained significant, F (1, 240) = 4.59, p < .05.  Likewise, when judgment of the perpetrator 
as emotionally affected was entered as a covariate, it remained significant, F(1, 240) = 3.90, 
p <.05.   The interaction also survived entry of satisfaction as a covariate, F (1, 240) = 4.01, p 
< .05. 
In the Group x Emotion x Action ANOVA on satisfaction (MSE = 5.61), there were 
main effects of emotion, F (2, 242) = 3.45, p < .05, and of action, F(1, 242) = 73.84, p < .001.  
Reparation (M = 7.11, SD = 2.27) was more satisfactory than withdrawal (M = 4.43, SD = 
2.53).  Post-hoc Tukey tests on emotion showed only a marginally significant difference, p = 
.08, in which shame (M = 6.21, SD = 2.92) was more satisfactory than no emotion (M = 
5.38, SD = 2.56); guilt fell in between (M = 5.60, SD = 2.76).  The Group x Emotion 
interaction was marginally significant, F(2, 242) = 2.37, p = .096, but no other interactions 
had p < .10, including the three-way, F(2, 242) = 0.25. When insult was added as a covariate, 
the three-way interaction remained nonsignificant with F < 1, and the Group x Emotion 
interaction was reduced to F(2, 241) = 1.02, p = .36.  Thus, satisfaction did not show the 
same specific interaction effect that insult did. 
Similar analyses with respect as a dependent variable likewise showed no significant 
effects other than a main effect of action, F(1, 184) = 28.44, MSE = 8.63, p < .001, such that 
reparation (M = 7.79, SD = 2.59) gained more respect overall than withdrawal (M = 5.54, SD 
= 3.21).   
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General Discussion 
These experiments showed that when an outgroup member provides reparations, an 
expression of shame mitigates insult better than an expression of guilt.  In Experiment 1, 
whose design always described reparations, and in the reparations conditions of Experiment 
2, shame was less insulting than guilt when the transgressor was presented as a member of an 
outgroup.  These effects were not found when the alternative response of withdrawal was 
presented.   Moreover, both experiments found the strongest effects on measures of insult, 
and found weak or no effects on satisfaction measures.  In Experiment 2, the addition of a no-
emotion condition also established that when an outgroup offered reparations, guilt and an 
explicitly emotionless response were equally insulting, whereas a shame expression worked 
to reduce the insult in those conditions.     
We believe our insult effect to be more specific than a simple desire for the outgroup 
to suffer the most painful emotion or to express the most dispositional negative self-
assessment.  Such prejudicial responses should have shown themselves regardless of the 
action taken.  Instead, in Experiment 2, the key interaction pattern involving guilt/shame and 
ingroup/outgroup on insult appeared only when reparations were proposed.  Merely 
prejudicial responses would have also extended to lower satisfaction and respect from the 
outgroup apology as well as higher insult.  However, the key interaction pattern on 
satisfaction was only marginally significant in Experiments 1, was not observed 
independently of insult in Experiment 2, and was also not moderated by action in Experiment 
2, whereas for respect the key pattern was not observed at all.   
Nevertheless, both studies found that shame overall, whether expressed by ingroup or 
outgroup members, tended to lead to more respect and satisfaction than guilt did.  This may 
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point to two different underlying processes.  Positive reactions to an apology may be dictated 
by the type of emotion expressed regardless of group membership, possibly due to ingroup 
bias or ultimate attribution error.  However, as we have shown, negative reactions such as 
insult are more sensitive to the combination of outgroup membership and an offer of 
reparations. 
We believe that our effects on insult cannot be explained merely by the fact that the 
shame expression was seen to be more emotionally affecting than the guilt expression. First, 
judgments of the perpetrator’s emotionality did not follow the same interaction patterns that 
insult did.  Second, in both experiments, the key interaction on insult remained significant 
when controlling for emotionality of the expression.   Another alternative explanation is that 
shame may have produced less insult because it made the perpetrator appear more 
responsible, but evidence from these experiments also speaks against this.  In neither 
experiment was the director in the shame condition rated as more culpable for the incident 
than the director in the guilt condition, and participants in Experiment 2 actually rated him as 
being more culpable for the incident when he expressed guilt, consistent with the definition 
of guilt emphasizing culpability for one’s actions.  It thus seems unlikely that the guilt 
condition could have led to the inference of less responsibility.  Finally, it is also not 
plausible that our key effects were due to surprise or suspicion at the combination of shame 
and reparation, as they remained significant when controlling for those variables. 
Experiment 2 also showed a strong main effect of action such that reparations created 
more positive responses, and less insult, than withdrawal.  This may explain why the 
outgroup’s expression of shame in the reparation condition was less insulting than in the 
withdrawal condition; overall, reparations tended to increase positive and reduce negative 
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reactions.   If the reparations were given with no emotion or the inappropriate emotion of 
guilt, however, insult was equally high as for withdrawal.  
We should also point out some limitations of these experiments.  We based our 
manipulations of shame and guilt conceptually on the work of Lewis and Tangney. It would 
also be useful to test expressions more directly derived from the alternative concept of shame 
as external social exposure (Smith et al., 2002), or to include stronger expressions of 
emotion, such as crying, as part of the guilt expression.  Also, the “no emotion” condition in 
Experiment 2 told participants the director felt no emotion, which might have been 
interpreted as an explicitly callous response; indeed, for the key conditions, this control was 
seen as just as insulting as the “guilt” condition.  Although a condition that said nothing about 
emotions might be a more appropriate control, problems also arise with this approach; 
participants might infer remorse from the situation, as in Schmitt et al. (2004), or might do so 
differentially depending on group membership.   
Implications 
These results provide an important demonstration of the functional nature of shame in 
an intergroup context.  In offering an apology to accompany reparations, outgroup members 
might be better off expressing the emotion of shame, which functions to signal lowered status 
in a social hierarchy (e.g., Gilbert, 2004).  Because the emotion of guilt functions to repair 
social relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994; 1995), our findings also 
suggest that someone who enjoys an existing ingroup relationship with the perceiver would 
not be insulted by a guilt expression, though even then, guilt seems to attract less positive 
responses than shame does.  This parallels criticism of existing theories and measures for 
ignoring positive aspects of shame and negative aspects of guilt (Luyten, Fontaine, & 
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Corveleyn, 2002).  In the light of findings that shame corresponds more to the real or 
imagined judgments of other people, relative to guilt (Smith et al., 2002), our findings 
indicate an appeasement function of shame, one that functions most strongly outside 
reciprocal relationships.  Shame, ultimately, may indeed be bad for the self, and for a dyad 
with expectations of mutual support.  However, by showing that people may be insulted by 
an outgroup expression of guilt, our findings add to previous questions raised about the 
usefulness of intergroup guilt (e.g., Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004).  At the same time, guilt 
may promote the more satisfying outcome of reparative action to a degree that counteracts 
any insult taken.  Perhaps the ideal, if unlikely, combination is to feel and act on guilt, but to 
express shame. 
We also believe that our existing findings have implications for the world of politics 
and public relations.  If avoiding insult toward the wronged is a goal, then the correct 
emotional stance while offering reparation varies depending on whether the wronged belong 
to the same or a different social group. Anecdotally, this observation is echoed by the 
skeptical response of the Arab world to U. S.  President Bush's 2004 statements on the torture 
of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, which characterized the abuse as a “mistake” not 
characteristic of Americans (Office of the Press Secretary, May 5, 2004).  Based on our 
findings, we would argue that Bush's apology might have insulted Arab outgroup members, 
in part because it used the language of contrition rather than self-abasement.   In cases such 
as this, it is possible that the apologizing person views the apology as constructive because it 
expressed some kind of moral emotion.   Moreover, the apologizing person’s ingroup 
constituency may share this view, and praise their leader for being a moral person.  This 
benefit may sometimes, in pragmatic terms, take precedence over the apology’s acceptance 
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by its recipients. But when the feelings of an apology’s recipients do matter, our results 
suggest that it is important to express shame, rather than mere guilt. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Mean insult by emotion and group, Experiment 1. 
Figure 2:  Mean insult by emotion, group and action, Experiment 2. 
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Figure 2 
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